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ABSTRACT
This study describes an outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections caused by contaminated bottled still
water (BSW) in six intensive care units (ICUs) of a German university hospital. Clinical and environmental
samples from these units were cultured and genotyped by ampliﬁed fragment-length polymorphism and
pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis analysis. Microbiological results were reviewed on a weekly basis to
determine the number of P. aeruginosa infections and colonisations of ICU patients. Clinical specimens
from 19 ICU patients—15 infections and four colonisations—yielded the same strain of P. aeruginosa.
Furthermore, four of 103 environmental samples also yielded P. aeruginosa. However, only a P. aeruginosa
strain isolated from unopened BSW was genetically identical to the P. aeruginosa strain isolated from the
patients. In the 42-week period before the outbreak, themeanweekly number of new ICUpatients infected
or colonised with P. aeruginosa was 46.9 (95% CI 40.7–53.1) ⁄ 1000 bed-days. During the 6-week period of
the outbreak, the weekly number of new patients with P. aeruginosa was 88.9 (95% CI 54.3–122.2) ⁄ 1000
bed-days. This number returned to the previous level after removal of the BSW. Thus, the microbiological
and epidemiological ﬁndings revealed that the outbreak was related to BSW contaminated with
P. aeruginosa. It was concluded that all untested BSW should be removed from ICUs.
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INTRODUCTION
Water is a typical source of outbreaks of infections
caused by microbial pathogens in hospitals [1]. To
avoid this potential risk, the CDC recommend the
use of sterile water for critical activities, e.g., to ﬁll
humidiﬁers in intensive care units (ICUs), and
that transplant recipients should use sterile water
for drinking and oral hygiene [2]. In practice,
bottled still water (BSW) is often used in hospitals
as drinking water instead of tap water. In ICUs,
BSW is frequently used to prepare medications
given via nasogastric tubes and for oropharyngeal
care.
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is among themost feared
pathogens associated with nosocomial infection,
especially amongmechanically ventilatedpatients.
P. aeruginosa pneumonia has been associated with
increased attributable mortality rates of 14% and a
prolonged length of stay for survivors [3]. The
multiple antibiotic resistancemechanisms found in
P. aeruginosa mean that antibacterial chemother-
apy is often problematical. Outbreaks of infection
caused by P. aeruginosa are common, and water,
especially in ICUs, is often the source [4–6]. The
present study describes an outbreak of P. aerugin-
osa infections and colonisations that was traced to
contaminated BSW, together with the control
measures that were implemented in order to
prevent further nosocomial infections.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Setting
Six ICUs at Charite´ – University Medical School, Berlin, Ger-
many were involved in the outbreak. The hospital is a 2400-bed
tertiary-care referral centre. The ICUs comprise a medical ICU
(MICU) (A) with 24 beds, occupied mainly by nephrology and
cardiology patients, one liver transplantation unit (E) with ten
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beds, three interdisciplinary ICUs—one surgical ⁄pulmonary
ICU (F) with 14 beds, two cardiosurgical ICUs (B andD)with 11
beds, and a surgical ICU (C) with 11 beds.
Epidemiological investigation
Cases were identiﬁed by reviewing clinical microbiological
records. Case deﬁnitions were changed during the outbreak.
Initially, in the ﬁrst week, a patient in the MICU who was
infected or colonised nosocomially with any strain of P. aeru-
ginosa was included. Subsequently, patients were included
only if they had a nosocomial infection or became colonised by
the speciﬁc outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa. Conﬁrmation of
the presence of this strain was based on the use of genotyping
methods (see below).
Patients who yielded P. aeruginosa from purulent tracheal
secretions or wounds, and who showed signs of systemic
inﬂammation (i.e., fever, leukocytosis, elevated C-reactive
protein) and clinical deterioration (i.e., impaired gas exchange)
or new pulmonary inﬁltrates consistent with consolidation
were considered to be infected. Patients who yielded
P. aeruginosa from non-purulent tracheal secretions or wounds
without signs of systemic infection or organ dysfunction were
considered to be colonised.
Surveillance
Microbiological data from six ICUs in which the outbreak
strain was detected were reviewed for 42 weeks before the
outbreak, during the outbreak period itself when patients were
positive for the outbreak strain, and during the 4 weeks
following the outbreak. Cases of P. aeruginosa infection or
colonisation were counted on a weekly basis. Every patient
was counted once only and included in the analysis.
Microbiological methods
Samples were taken from surfaces in the ICUs, e.g., bedpan
washers, computer mice, breathing masks, respirators, wiping
cloths, call buttons, dialysis machines and critical care charts,
using contact plates (RODAC blood agar plates; Oxoid, Wesel,
Germany). Putative P. aeruginosa colonies from contact plates
were restreaked on MacConkey agar.
Samples of tap water, cleaning solutions, liquid soaps,
disinfectants, ice cubes, nebuliser water, ultrasound gel, tea,
water traps of respirator circuits, equipment for oropharyngeal
care and BSW were sent for bacterial culture. Liquid samples
(100 mL where possible) were ﬁltered through a 0.2-lm
cellulose membrane ﬁlter before culture (see below).
Sterile cotton swabs were used to take samples from
siphons, nebulisers, electric kettles, bedpan washers, dish-
washers, and water outlets (faucet aerators). Cellulose mem-
brane ﬁlters and swabs were enriched in malachite broth for
24–48 h and then plated on MacConkey agar. Typical P. aeru-
ginosa colonies growing on MacConkey agar were conﬁrmed
as P. aeruginosa using the API 20 NE system (bioMe´rieux,
Marcy-l’Etoile, France).
Molecular typing
During the outbreak period and the following 4 weeks, all
P. aeruginosa isolates found in samples taken from ICU
patients and from ICU environmental sources were typed
using molecular methods. Since most P. aeruginosa isolates
from ICU patients were collected routinely during the 6-month
period preceding the outbreak, it was possible to compare the
typing results obtained in the non-outbreak and the outbreak
periods. DNA ﬁngerprint proﬁles of the P. aeruginosa isolates
were analysed independently using a repetitive extragenic
palindromic-PCR technique with ERIC2 primers and an
ampliﬁed fragment-length polymorphism method with
EcoRI-0 and MseI-C primers [7,8]. Isolates were assigned to
the same strain if the percentage of genetic similarity was
>80% according to both typing methods following cluster
analysis using UPGMA and the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient
(Gel Compar II; Applied Maths, Sint-Martins-Latem, Bel-
gium). Pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis was subsequently used
to analyse all isolates to conﬁrm the PCR results, with SpeI
macrorestriction proﬁles being compared visually after sepa-
ration by pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis and interpretation
according to the criteria of Tenover et al. [9,10].
Statistical analysis
The numbers of infections and colonisations that occurred
during the non-outbreak period were compared with those
during the outbreak period. The mean number of P. aeruginosa
cases was determined for both periods, with each patient
counted once only, and 95% CIs and standard deviations were
calculated. Bed-days were used as the denominator, as there
were no changes in the average bed utilisation during the
overall period. The data collected were analysed using STATA
software v.7 (Stat Corp., College Station, TX, USA) [11].
RESULTS
Time-scale of the outbreak
On day 1, ﬁve patients with P. aeruginosa isolates
had been detected in the MICU within the
preceding 11 days and the infection control
service was informed. After a further 2 days,
two further patients were found to be positive for
P. aeruginosa. On day 4, the isolates from ﬁve of
the seven patients were found to be genetically
indistinguishable. On day 7, a thorough screening
programme was undertaken, which included
taking 103 samples from numerous sites in the
inanimate environment. Three of four siphon
samples, two further patients and one bottle of
mineral water were positive for P. aeruginosa. On
day 11, molecular typing revealed that the isolates
from the ﬁrst ﬁve patients, the two screened
patients and the mineral water samples were
genetically indistinguishable. The isolates from
the siphon were unrelated. All mineral water was
removed from the ICUs on day 11, but a further
12 patients were found to harbour the same strain
in weeks 3–4.
Further investigation revealed that ﬁve addi-
tional unopened 750-mL bottles from the same
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batch of BSW were positive for the outbreak
strain, while six bottles from the same batch did
not contain the outbreak strain. No other nosoco-
mial pathogen was found in the tested BSW.
Two bottles were sent to the local veterinary
health department, which conﬁrmed the results
obtained. The information was sent to the local
health department responsible for the area in
which the BSW supplier was located, but no
further information was received concerning
measures taken by the supplier.
BSW was used for the preparation of orally
administered medications and oral ﬂuid replace-
ment on all ICUs, even for patients with a
tracheostomy. The hospital was supplied with
new batches of BSW every 2 weeks. There was no
registration of the batch numbers of BSW before
the outbreak, and 5000 bottles ⁄month were being
used in the hospital. In the MICU, where the
initial cases were recognised during the ﬁrst week
of the outbreak, 240 bottles of BSW were deliv-
ered 2 weeks before the ﬁrst case. It is assumed
that this might have been the contaminated batch,
since no BSW was delivered to the MICU in the
week preceding the outbreak.
Outcome
Infections were caused by the outbreak strain in
15 (78.9%) of the 19 ICU patients from whom it
was isolated (Table 1). Three (20%) of the 15
patients were diagnosed with wound infections,
and 12 (80%) had pneumonia. Four patients were
colonised: two in the throat, one in the lung, and
one in a wound. Ten (83.3%) of the 12 patients
with pneumonia were intubated, and seven
(58.3%) of these patients had a tracheostomy
when P. aeruginosa was isolated. Seven patients
were fed and medicated via a nasogastric tube.
All four patients with colonised or infected
wounds were post-surgery patients. Three
patients from whom the outbreak strain was
isolated died during their hospital stay. One
patient died following refractory multi-organ
failure, and P. aeruginosa pneumonia was the
most likely cause of death for this patient.
The overall attack-rate (case patients divided by
the total ICU patients) during the 6-week period
of the outbreak on the six ICUs was 3.1%, with a
rate of 6.0% in the MICU, 1.4% in ICU B, 4.8% in
ICU C, 0.7% in ICU D, 5.1% in ICU E, and 2.9%
in ICU F.
Surveillance
During the 42-week period before the outbreak,
the mean weekly number of patients with P. aeru-
ginosa isolated from clinical specimens was 46.9
(SD 22.2; 95% CI 40.7–53.1) ⁄ 1000 bed-days on the
six ICUs involved. During the 6-week period of
the outbreak, the weekly occurrence of new
P. aeruginosa-positive patients ⁄ 1000 bed-days
was 74.1, 74.1, 123.5, 111.1, 37.0 and 111.1 (mean
88.9; CI 95% 54.3–122.2) (Fig. 1). The weekly
mean number of P. aeruginosa isolates that did
not belong to the outbreak strain was 49.4 ⁄ 1000
Table 1. Characteristics of 19 patients from whom the outbreak strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa was isolated
Unit Gender Age (years)
Days from detection
of ﬁrst case to case Specimen
Infection or
colonisation Devicea Outcome
B M 53 First case Tracheal secretion Pneumonia int, tra Survived
A F 82 3 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia int, tra, or Survived
A M 78 6 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia int, or Died
A M 69 13 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia int, tra, or Survived
A F 74 13 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia int, tra, or Survived
A M 70 14 Bronchial secretion Colonisation Survived
C M 72 14 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia int, tra, or Survived
F M 43 16 Wound smear Wound infection int, tra Survived
A M 32 17 Pharyngeal smear Colonisation int, tra Survived
A M 50 17 Pharyngeal smear Colonisation Survived
C M 71 18 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia or Survived
D M 68 21 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia int, tra Survived
E M 45 23 Bronchial secretion Pneumonia int Died
E M 28 23 Wound smear Colonisation Survived
E M 55 28 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia Survived
B F 79 29 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia int, tra Survived
F M 38 32 Wound smear Wound infection Survived
A M 64 37 Tracheal secretion Pneumonia int, or Died
F F 77 37 Wound smear Wound infection Survived
aint, intubation; tra, tracheostoma; or,oral tube.
M, male; F, female.
Units: A, medical intensive care unit (ICU); B and D, cardiosurgical ICUs; C, surgical ICU; E, liver transplantation unit ICU; F, surgical ⁄pulmonary ICU.
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bed-days. During the outbreak, 19 (44.2%) of 43
P. aeruginosa isolates belonged to the outbreak
strain. During the 4-week period following the
outbreak, the weekly number of P. aeruginosa
isolates ⁄ 1000 bed-days returned to baseline (mean
number 40.7, 95% CI 0–88.9).
Termination of the outbreak
All commercially available BSW was removed
from all ICUs. During the 13-day period following
the removal of the BSW, P. aeruginosawas isolated
from ﬁve more patients with nosocomial infec-
tions. These ﬁve patients were all admitted to the
hospital before the removal of BSW. Thereafter,
no further isolates of the outbreak strain were
detected in the six ICUs.
DISCUSSION
This hospital-wide outbreak of P. aeruginosa infec-
tions ⁄ colonisations was associated with a single
contaminated batch of BSW, as conﬁrmed by the
microbiological and epidemiological ﬁndings.
Genetically indistinguishable isolates of P. aeru-
ginosa were obtained from 19 infected or colon-
ised ICU patients, and following examination of
multiple samples from the environment in the
ICU, only P. aeruginosa from the BSW was genet-
ically identical to the outbreak strain. Two weeks
after removing the BSW from the ICUs, the
number of infections and colonisations with
P. aeruginosa showed a statistically signiﬁcant
decrease. Initially, the simultaneous outbreak on
different ICUs, the absence of the pathogen
in samples from the inanimate environment,
especially in siphons, and the genetic distinction
from any P. aeruginosa strain found before the
outbreak seemed inexplicable. These ﬁndings
excluded the possibility of patient-to-patient
transmission. Only if the pathogen originated
from an external source, i.e., the BSW, can these
results be explained. This outbreak emphasises
the fact that many nosocomial outbreaks of
infection may be overlooked without the imple-
mentation of a high-level surveillance system. The
types of infections and colonisations in the lungs
that constituted the outbreak are probably caused
by transmission of P. aeruginosa through aspira-
tion and ⁄ or microaspiration from the oropharynx
to the lungs [11,12]. The pathogen can also be
transmitted from stomach to lungs when drugs
are prepared and given with the contaminated
BSW via nasogastric tubes [13].
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst outbreak
described in ICU patients that has been associated
with bacterial contamination of commercial BSW.
However, a previous report [14] described 47
cases of serologically conﬁrmed hepatitis A,
occurring over a period of 5 months in a town
in central Italy, in which a single brand of mineral
water, as well as consumption of raw mussels,
were implicated because of signiﬁcant odds
ratios in a case-control study. Several other
studies have investigated bacterial contamination
of BSW, and have generally revealed high
total bacterial counts and contamination with
Gram-negative pathogens, e.g., Klebsiella oxytoca,
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia and Pseudomonas
spp., particularly in non-sparkling water [15–18].
These ﬁndings suggest that the use of BSW in
many ICUs [19] is inappropriate.
While many countries have national standards
for bottled water, and some have a national
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lates from patients in the six inten-
sive care units (ICUs) before the
outbreak (weeks 1–42), during the
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the outbreak (weeks 49–52) (black,
196 non-outbreak isolates; white, 19
outbreak isolates). Patients were
counted once only. The arrow marks
the point at which the bottled still
water was removed from the ICUs.
The outbreak took place during
spring.
Eckmanns et al. P. aeruginosa in bottled water 457
 2008 The Authors
Journal Compilation  2008 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 14, 454–458
certiﬁcation scheme, no universally accepted
international certiﬁcation scheme exists. In Ger-
many, a special legal requirement for mineral and
table water states that 250 mL of BSW should be
entirely free of P. aeruginosa. The international
codex standard for natural mineral waters from
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, an inter-
governmental body for the development of inter-
nationally recognised standards for food, is less
rigorous, stating that BSW should be rejected if
250 mL of BSW contain >2 CFU of P. aeruginosa,
and does not state the time after bottle ﬁlling at
which this test should be performed.
It is possible that contaminated BSW is a
potential explanation for the increase in the isola-
tion rate of several pathogens in ICUs. Outbreaks
caused by contaminated water are usually limited
in time, as the contamination is usually restricted
to a small number of bottles or batches of bottles,
but create a risk of introducing new pathogens
and ⁄ or bacterial clones into the hospital environ-
ment. Evidence suggests that the sources of 50% of
outbreaks with potentially waterborne pathogens,
e.g., Pseudomonas spp., Serratia spp., Acinetobacter
spp., Enterobacter spp., Stenotrophomonas spp. and
Klebsiella spp., in ICUs remain unknown (http://
www.outbreak-database.com), and some, at least,
could be associated with contaminated BSW.
In view of these ﬁndings, consideration should
be given to removing all BSW from ICUs, or at
least testing it microbiologically on a regular
basis. Instead, sterile bottled water or ﬁltered tap
water should be used. These measures are not
necessarily more expensive and take the potential
risks for patients into account [19].
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